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INSULIN-DEPENDENT DIABETES AND
ACCESS TO TREATMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE:
THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TO PROVIDE
PROTECTION
MARGARET C. MCGRATH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I had decisions to make. I was scheduled to begin my new
career with the Cubs; what was I going to tell them? Should I
keep my secret and give myself a chance to let them judge me
without prejudice? Or should I tell them up front, and risk
having them look only at the disease instead of looking at the
player? I just didn't know what to do. Ron Santo'
Ron Santo, former Chicago Cubs star, chose not to tell his
potential employers about his insulin-dependent diabetes in 1959,
a choice still made by some individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes today. 2 Those who do choose to tell their employers about
their disease can face an uphill battle to receive an accommodation
that allows them to remain in control of their diabetes while at
3
work.
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)4 in
Joint J.D./LL.M. Candidate in The John Marshall Law School LL.M.
in Employee Benefits, June 2004. The author would like to thank her family
for their support and encouragement.
1. RON SANTO & RANDY MINKOFF, FOR LOVE OF Ivy, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF RON SANTO 15 (1993).

2. See, e.g., Cupola v. Centr. Can Co., No. 97-C-3819, 1999 WL 199621 at
*13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff presented no evidence
that the employer knew of his insulin-dependent diabetes).
3. See Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp. 2d 737, 740-41
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (discussing an employer's increased restrictions on bathroom
access once the employer knew the plaintiff required access due to insulindependent diabetes) and Landers v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 99-CV-453, 2001
WL 1725300 at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001) (noting an employer's denial of a
medically necessary lunch break for an individual with insulin-dependent
diabetes).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)
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1990 offered individuals with diabetes the promise of protection
from employment discrimination. 5
Congress
specifically
mentioned diabetes as a condition that it intended the ADA to
cover. 6
However, courts have not always found diabetes a
7
disability.
This Comment examines the disparity in determining the
disability status of individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes
under the ADA. Part II of the Comment discusses the different
types of diabetes, treatment protocols,
and short-term
complications. Part II also surveys the discrimination individuals
with
insulin-dependent
diabetes
have
encountered
in
8
employment.
Part III analyzes the homogeneous nature of
individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes and the difficulties
encountered in establishing disability status under the ADA. Part
III goes on to analyze the different responses courts give to the
question of insulin-dependent diabetes as a disability, and
addresses the reasons that courts diverge in their holdings. 9 Part
IV analyzes judicial and legislative solutions that would allow
individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes to effectively treat
their condition in the workplace.
II.

TYPES OF DIABETES AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

A.

Diabetes: Types, Treatments and Complications

Diabetes is a general term that refers to several different
conditions 10 affecting sixteen million Americans.11
The two

[hereinafter, ADA].
5. Denney v. Mosey Mfg. Co., No. IP 98-852-C H/G, 2000 WL 680417 at *8

(S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2000) (noting that the legislative history of the ADA clearly
demonstrated Congress' intent to protect individuals with diabetes).
6. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990) and S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22
(1989). Both reports specifically list diabetes as an impairment under the first
prong of the ADA's definition of disability, which includes "any individual who
has a 'physical or mental impairment."' S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989).
7. Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding

that an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes was not disabled because
he used insulin to mitigate his condition). The effect of the ruling allowed the
employer to deny the plaintiff access to the very mitigating measures that
rendered him not disabled. Id. Cf.Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 918 F.3d 916
(7th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant). The court
held that a jury could find an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes
disabled because of the severe limitation on his ability to eat that exists when
he uses insulin and the dire consequences that could result from not following
strict dietary restrictions. Id. at 924-25.
8. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION
COMPLETE GUIDE TO DIABETES 413-21 (2d ed. 1999).

9. See cases cited supra note 7 (revealing courts' inconsistent holdings as
to the disability status of a plaintiff with diabetes).
10. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 5.
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primary types of diabetes are insulin-dependent, 12 affecting five to
ten percent of all individuals with diabetes, 13 and non-insulindependent diabetes,1 4 affecting ninety to ninety-five percent of all
individuals with diabetes. 15 There are other, less common, types
6
of diabetes that are not considered in this Comment.'
All individuals with diabetes have untreated blood glucose
levels that are too high.' 7 High blood glucose levels cause shortterm symptoms such as extreme thirst, frequent urination, blurred
vision, and exhaustion.' 8
Long term complications include
blindness, kidney failure, amputations, and heart disease. 19 The
elevated blood glucose levels are due to the body's inability to
remove glucose from the blood stream and deliver it to the cells of
the body. 20 The cause of this inability depends on the type of
diabetes, 21 but all of the causes are linked to the hormone insulin,
22
which is produced by the pancreas.
1. Insulin-DependentDiabetes
The formal definition of insulin-dependent diabetes is "that
form of diabetes which, in the absence of insulin treatment, causes

11. Id. at 8.
12. Insulin-dependent diabetes results when the immune system of the
body destroys the beta cells of the pancreas so it produces little or no insulin.
CHRISTOPHER D. SAUDEK, M.D. ET AL., THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO
DIABETES 19 (1997).
13. DIABETES SOURCEBOOK 4 (Dawn Matthews ed., 2003).
14. Non-insulin-dependent diabetes results when the pancreas makes
inadequate amounts of insulin. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 25.
15. DIABETES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 5.
16. The most common form of diabetes not discussed is gestational
diabetes, which occurs during the late stages of pregnancy and may be caused
by either a shortage of insulin or the hormones of pregnancy. Frequently this
form of diabetes disappears after the birth of the child. Developing gestational
diabetes can indicate a higher likelihood of developing non-insulin-dependent
diabetes later in life. NATIONAL DIABETES INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
YOUR GUIDE TO DIABETES: TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2 (Sept. 7, 2002) available at
http://www.niddk.nih.gov/health/diabetes/pubs/typel-2/what.htm
(National
Diabetes Information Clearinghouse is the public information arm of the
National Institutes of Health's National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive
and Kidney Disease).
17. MAYO CLINIC ON MANAGING DIABETES 7 (Maria Collazo-Clavell, M.D.
ed., 2001).
18. Id. at 11-12.
19. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 301-23.
20. Id. at 5.
21. MAYO CLINIC ON MANAGING DIABETES, supra note 17, at 8-11.
22. Insulin causes blood glucose levels to go down by making it possible for
glucose to enter cells and serve as fuel. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 11.
Insulin works by binding to a receptor on the cell surface. Id. After binding,
glucose can pass through the outer membrane and into the cell where it
provides energy. Id.
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ketoacidosis and ultimately death."23 Individuals with insulindependent diabetes do not produce any insulin and must inject
insulin on a daily basis. 24 These injections treat, but do not cure
diabetes. 25
The goal of injecting insulin is to mirror the
functioning of the normal pancreas. 26 However, achieving this is
27
difficult for all individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes.
Closely mimicking the function of the normal pancreas is desirable
due to the decreased incidence of long-term complications due to
diabetes. 28 Many factors complicate the process of emulating
normal pancreas functions, 29 including the type and amount of
32
31
food eaten, 30 the duration, intensity and time of exercise, stress,
and illness or injury. 33 Failure to inject the correct amount of
insulin will lead to short-term complications such as

23. Id. at 19.
24.

STANLEY MIRSKY & JOAN RATTNER HEILMAN, CONTROLLING DIABETES

THE EASY WAY 105 (3rd ed. 1998).
25. Id. at 109. A cure for diabetes may be found at some time in the future.
Id.
26. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 36.
27. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 38-39. All individuals with insulindependent diabetes have widely fluctuating blood glucose levels in spite of
their attempts at intensive treatment and the best levels of self-care. Id.
28. MAYO CLINIC ON MANAGING DIABETES, supra note 17, at 158-59. The
ten-year-long Diabetes Control and Complications Trial, a study involving
only individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes begun in 1983, demonstrated
that maintaining blood glucose levels close to the normal levels for nondiabetics resulted in reduced risk for developing long-term complications. Id.
The risk of developing diabetic retinopathy, responsible for blindness, was
reduced seventy-six percent. The risk of developing nephropathy, responsible
for kidney failure, was reduced fifty percent.
The risk of developing
neuropathy, nerve damage responsible for amputations, was reduced sixty
percent. The risk of developing cardiovascular disease was reduced thirty-five
percent. Id.
29. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 20-21. The authors compared a
normal pancreas to a furnace with a thermostat that adjusts to provide the
exact amount of heat required at each time of the day and insulin injections to
a woodstove that requires guessing how much fuel must be added in the
morning for the entire day. Id. at 21.
30. SUE K. MILCHOVICH & BARBARA DUNN-LONG, DIABETES MELLITUS: A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK 8-9 (7th ed. 1999) (discussing the types of foods,
carbohydrates, proteins, and fats, and their impact on blood glucose levels).
31. Id. at 153-54 (discussing the impact exercise has on the body in general
and the interaction of exercise and blood glucose levels).
32. Id. at 175. Stress produces hormones that can force blood glucose levels
up. Id. Stress contributes to unanticipated swings in blood glucose levels, the
stress of driving in heavy traffic or being in an accident cannot be easily
measured like carbohydrate grams, units of insulin, or exercise minutes.
AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 144.
33. Id. at 144-45. Illness also stresses the body and results in the release of
hormones to fight the illness. Id. The hormones released as a result of the
stress illness places on the body counteract the insulin injected and cause
blood glucose levels to rise and sends them out of control. Id.
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hypoglycemia 34 or diabetic ketoacidosis.
Hypoglycemia occurs when more insulin is injected than the
body needs. 36
Hypoglycemic reactions vary widely and are
grouped into three categories: 37 mild, moderate, and severe. 38 The
likelihood that an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes will
experience a severe hypoglycemic reaction, including falling into a
coma or having seizures, increases over time due to the
39
development of hypoglycemia unawareness.
Hypoglycemia unawareness forces individuals with insulindependent diabetes to monitor their blood glucose levels on a
regular basis. 40 Self-monitoring yields an accurate blood glucose
reading from a drop of blood within seconds. 41 After such testing,
an individual can determine what kind of treatment, if any, is
42
needed.
43
Diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA), a life threatening complication,

34. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 63-64.

35. Id. at 290-91.
36. AMERICAN

DIABETES

ASSOCIATION,

supra

note

8,

at

160.

"Hypoglycemia is usually caused by insulin doing its job too well....

The

body's use of insulin is inconsistent. Even if you always give yourself the same

dose of insulin ....

you could end up with more than enough insulin to handle

the glucose in your blood." Id.
37. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 68.
38. The symptoms of mild hypoglycemic reactions include sweating,
trembling, a feeling of not thinking clearly, and a sense or abnormal behavior.
Id. Confusion and inappropriate actions characterize moderate hypoglycemic
reactions. Id. In spite of the confusion, the individual will still have enough
awareness of the situation to self-treat the problem. Id. Extreme confusion,
seizures, and coma characterize severe hypoglycemic reactions. Id.
The
individual suffering from a severe reaction will require assistance to treat the
problem, someone will have to administer glucose or other fast-acting sugars
or will need to inject glucophage. Id.
39. Id. at 73.
Individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes become
hypoglycemia unaware over a period of fifteen to twenty years.
Id.
Hypoglycemia unawareness is the result of nerve damage, which blocks the
normal physical responses to hypoglycemia. Id. As a result, there are no
symptoms detectable by the individual until they are so confused and
disoriented that they are unable to self-treat. Id.
40. See, e.g., DIABETES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 163 (discussing how
nerve damage can make it difficult to feel the symptoms of hypoglycemia).
Hypoglycemia unawareness also develops in individual who have insulindependent diabetes for a long period of time. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at
73. Individuals who become hypoglycemic unaware test their blood glucose
levels more often than those who are not. Id.
41. DIABETES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 123.
42. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 164-65. Individuals
with insulin-dependent diabetes should test their blood sugar if they think
they are experiencing a hypoglycemic reaction and then should treat any
verified low blood glucose readings with fast-acting sugars. Id.
43. PAULA BRISCO, DIABETES: QUESTIONS You HAVE... ANSWERS YOU
NEED 95 (1993). High blood glucose levels, if not detected and treated, result
in symptoms such as fever, thirst, vomiting and nausea, frequent urination,
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occurs when too little insulin in the body leads to very high blood
glucose levels. 44 DKA can develop as the result of inadequate
insulin injections or because of stress or illness, 45 but is avoidable
46
with vigilant self-monitoring.
2. Non-Insulin-Dependent Diabetes
The formal definition of non-insulin-dependent diabetes is
"that form of diabetes which does not require insulin treatment to
avoid ketoacidosis. 47
Non-insulin-dependent diabetes is "a
fundamentally different disease"48 from insulin- dependent
diabetes because the pancreas does make insulin, but the amounts
are inadequate due to resistance by the body's cells to insulin. 49
Non-insulin-dependent diabetes is more stable than insulindependent diabetes because of the production of insulin.5 0 Blood
glucose levels may still be too high, but DKA rarely occurs. 51
Non-insulin-dependent diabetes is significantly different from
insulin-dependent diabetes in that it can be managed by many
methods.5 2 The treatment methods will vary based on the level of
insulin resistance 53 and can include a well-balanced diet and
regular exercise, 54 oral medications, 55 or insulin injections. 56

dehydration, coma, and death. Id. DKA occurs because inadequate amounts
of insulin cause cells to feel starved; in response the body breaks down fat cells
for energy. Id. A byproduct of this breakdown is the formation of ketones,
which the kidneys attempt to flush from the body by producing copious
amounts of urine, causing dehydration. Id.
44. Id. at 94.
45. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 171.
46. Id. DKA does not occur without warning, and if individuals with
insulin-dependent diabetes test frequently throughout the day, they will not
miss the indicative high blood glucose levels. Id. at 172.
47. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 25.
48. Id.
49. MAYO CLINIC ON MANAGING DIABETES, supra note 17, at 9.
50. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 27.
51. Id.
52. MILCHOVICH & DUNN-LONG, supra note 30, at 5.
53. DIANA W. GUTHRIE & RICHARD A. GUTHRIE, THE DIABETES
SOURCEBOOK: TODAY'S METHODS AND WAYS TO GIVE YOURSELF THE BEST
CARE 30-31 (4th ed. 1999).
54. Id.

55. Id. Oral medications can include sulfonylurea drugs, which encourage
the pancreas to produce more insulin, and biguanides, which decrease the
amount of glucose in the body. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note
8, at 44-45.
56. GUTHRIE & GUTHRIE, supra note 53, at 30-31. Injecting insulin does
not transform a individual with non-insulin-dependent diabetes into an
individual with insulin-dependent diabetes. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at
30.
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B. Employment DiscriminationAgainst
Individuals with Insulin-DependentDiabetes
Historically,
individuals
with
diabetes
have
faced
discrimination in employment. 57 The discrimination has included
"refusal to hire based on presumptions, stereotypes and myths
about job performance, safety, insurance costs, absenteeism, and
acceptance by coworkers."58 Individuals with diabetes also suffer
from
refusals
to
accommodate
their
medical
needs, 59
60
6
1
terminations, and involuntary demotions or transfers.
1.

HiringDiscrimination

Hiring discrimination occurs when employers engage in the
evaluation of an individual based upon "presumptions, stereotypes
and myths" 62 and make hiring or retention decisions based on the
existence of a disability rather than the ability of the person to
perform a given job. 63 Hiring discrimination seems to fall into two
65
main categories, irrational fears 64 and direct threat.
Employers engage in discriminatory practices based on
irrational fears when they fire or refuse to hire applicants because
of their insulin-dependent diabetes.6 6 Employers have refused to
57. Employment application

forms asked

questions

about

applicants'

physical conditions, and the responses were used to exclude those with hidden
disabilities, including diabetes, from employment. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 39
(1989).
58. Id. at 9.
59. See, e.g., Nawrot v. CPC Int'l, 277 F.3d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 2002)
(discussing an employer who refused to let an employee with insulindependent diabetes take breaks to check his blood glucose level and take any
appropriate action to adjust it).
60. See, e.g., Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665 (7th Cir.
1995) (dealing with an employer who discharged an employee with insulindependent diabetes who had a hypoglycemic reaction at work).
61. See, e.g., Simms v. City of N.Y., 160 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (considering an employer who restricted the type of positions that an
individual with insulin-dependent diabetes could hold, thereby reducing
overtime income and other benefits).
62. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9(1989).
63. Id. at 28-29.
64. See Norwood v. Litwin Eng'r & Constructors, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 220, 222
(Tex. App. 1998) (concerning an employer who fired an employee following a
hypoglycemic reaction).
65. Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 892-93 (9th Cir.
2001).
66. See Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 511 N.W.2d 482, 487
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (considering an employer who refused to hire an
individual with insulin-dependent diabetes because "they didn't feel they
wanted to hire a diabetic."); Norwood, 962 S.W.2d at 222 (dealing with an
employer who fired an employee with insulin-dependent diabetes within
fourteen days after the employee had his first hypoglycemic reaction at work
in twenty-seven years); Price v. Dolphin Serv., Inc., No. Civ.A.99-3888, 2000
WL 1789962, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2000) (discussing an employer who fired
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hire applicants based on a diagnosis of insulin-dependent
68
diabetes 67 or because of predetermined blood glucose levels.
Employers sometimes justify their discrimination by
asserting the affirmative defense of a direct threat. 69 Under this
defense, an employer is not required to hire or retain an individual
if that person would pose a significant risk of injury to themselves
or others.70 The U.S. Supreme Court set out a test for determining
if an employee presents a direct threat in School Board of Nassau
County v. ArlineJ 1 This test has been adapted to require an
evaluation regarding the extent of the risk, 72the potential for
injury, and the possibility of mitigating the risk.
Using the direct threat defense, employers have sought to
an employee with insulin-dependent diabetes who had two hypoglycemic
reactions at work within a six month period); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd.,
149 F.3d 626, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing an employer who failed to
offer a driver who had developed insulin-dependent diabetes another position
before he lost his seniority, instead offering to transfer him to a lower paying
job after a one year medical leave).
67. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 857 (1st Cir. 1998)
(considering an employer who refused to hire an individual with insulindependent diabetes for a mechanic position); EEOC v. Murray, Inc., 175 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1055-56 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (dealing with an employer who fired
an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes upon discovering his condition,
believing that he was no longer able to safely operate the forklift which he had
operated for over twenty-five years); Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176 F.3d
840, 841-42, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1999) (reconsidering prior court rulings that
employers could exclude individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes from
positions requiring driving when the city excluded an individual with insulindependent diabetes from police cadet training).
68. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(discussing an employer's refusal to hire an individual with insulin-dependent
diabetes because of a blanket exclusion based on blood glucose levels).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). An employer may impose a qualification
standard requiring "that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
The statute
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." Id.
defines a "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id. at § 12111(3).
70. Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981).
71. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The test
required a fact specific inquiry:
The basic factors to be considered in conducting this inquiry are well
established. In the context of the employment of a person handicapped
with a contagious disease, we agree with amicus American Medical
Association that this inquiry should include "[findings of] facts based on
reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge,
about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the
duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of
the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying
degrees of harm." Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus
Curiae 19.
Id. at 287-88.
72. Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
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exclude employees from positions that require driving. 73 Many
employers based their arguments on the Department of
Transportation (DOT) ban on employing individuals with insulindependent diabetes as commercial drivers. 74
Others have
75
rationalized their restrictions based on specific incidents.
Employers have used the direct threat defense in other situations,
76
including positions involving dangerous chemicals.
2.

Workplace Discrimination

Individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes are also subject
to discrimination on the job, facing denial of access to medically
necessary physical accommodations 77 and treatment, 78 and

73. See, e.g., Arnold, 136 F.3d at 862 (refusing to hire an individual with
insulin-dependent diabetes). The employer refused -to hire the plaintiff
because of his inability to acquire a commercial driver's license even though
the position he applied for was truck mechanic. Id.
74. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (2003) (prohibiting employers who engage in
interstate commerce from employing individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes as commercial truck drivers). DOT regulations are absolute with no
allowance for discretion based upon medical examination. Thoms v. ABF
Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1998). Based on the
DOT's blanket exclusion, an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes was
not qualified to drive a city vehicle and could therefore be excluded from any
employment requiring him to drive. Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.2d 1385,
1395 (5th Cir. 1993). An individual with insulin-dependent diabetes had to
prove that the driving position he sought only involved intrastate commerce so
as not to be subject to the DOT exclusion. Tinjum v. Atl. Richfield Co., 34 P.3d
855, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
75. See, e.g., Zenaty-Paulson v. McLane/Sunsweet Inc., 2000 WL 33300666,
at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2000) (discussing an employer who regarded an
employee with insulin-dependent diabetes as substantially limited in her
ability to work). The plaintiff experienced hypoglycemic reactions including
seizures, and so her employer believed that the plaintiffs driver's license had
been revoked, and that therefore she was substantially limited in her ability to
work. Id.
76. See, e.g., Hutton, 273 F.3d at 886-91 (describing an employer who fired
a chlorine finishing operator after he had hypoglycemic reactions at work
because he presented a direct threat to others). The court based its analysis of
direct threat on the potential for a catastrophic event and the severity and
scale of potential harm to others due to the dangerous nature of chlorine. Id.
at 894.
77. See, e.g., Heimback v. Lehigh Valley Plastics, Inc., 2000 WL 14871, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2000) (dealing with an employer who denied an individual
with insulin-dependent diabetes a requested accommodation). The employee,
a fabrication technician who also had cirrhosis of the liver and kidney
dysfunction, was denied the requested accommodation of working in a sitting
position or taking occasional breaks to relieve the swelling in her extremities
caused by standing. Id.
78. See, e.g., Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 901 (refusing requested breaks). The
employer refused to let an employee with insulin-dependent diabetes take
breaks to check his blood glucose levels and take any appropriate action. Id.
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79
involuntarily demotions or transfers.
The refusal of medically necessary physical accommodations,
such as adequate access to a restroom, typically arises in more
structured work settings such as factories,80 but can occur
anywhere.8 1 Denial of access to medically needed treatment occurs
in all types of employment, from accounting8 2 to retail sales8 3 and
Employers have denied or significantly
manufacturing.8 4
restricted access to food,85 blood glucose testing,88 and insulin8 7 for
individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes.
There are also examples of discriminatory actions involving
demotions and involuntary transfers.85 Employees have seen their
salaries slashed or their chances for promotion, overtime, and
other benefits eliminated solely because of their insulin-dependent

79. See, e.g., Simms, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (restricting types of positions
for an firefighter with insulin-dependent diabetes). City policy restricted the
positions that an insulin-dependent firefighter could hold, diminishing
responsibilities and potential for promotion. Id.
80. Heimback, 2000 WL 14871, at *1.
81. See, e.g., Erjavac, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (discussing denial of adequate
bathroom access). The employer imposed additional restrictions on bathroom
access once the employer was informed the employee needed access because
she had insulin-dependent diabetes. Id.
82. Arena v. AGIP USA, Inc., 2000 WL 264312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2000) (claiming that the employer prevented plaintiff from administering
insulin).
83. Landers, 2001 WL 1725300, at *2 (denying an employee with insulindependent diabetes a lunch break).
84. Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 901-02 (denying employee short breaks away from
the production floor to monitor blood sugar levels).
85. See Fraser v. U.S. Bancorp, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1189-90 (D. Or. 2001)
(considering an employer who barred an employee with insulin-dependent
diabetes from eating at her desk and subsequently fired her after she became
unconscious at work due to low blood sugars); Denney, 2000 WL 680417, at *3
(discussing a supervisor who told an employee with insulin-dependent
diabetes that he could not go to the break room during working hours to get a
snack because the machines he was operating were more important than
employees' blood glucose level); Landers, 2001 WL 1725300, at *2 (concerning
an employers' refusal to allow an employee with insulin-dependent diabetes to
take a scheduled lunch break).
86. See Denney, 2000 WI 680417, at *4 (considering a supervisor who
slapped an employee with insulin-dependent diabetes on the arm while he was
testing blood glucose levels and told him get back to work and test on his own
time); Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 901 (discussing an employer's refusal of repeated
requests by an employee with insulin-dependent diabetes to take breaks to
monitor his blood glucose levels).
87. See, e.g., Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co., 76 Cal. App. 4th 33, 44
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (concerning employer's denial of access to a clean location
in which to inject insulin, and to medically necessary access to food).
88. See, e.g., Simms, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (denying overtime and career
advancement). The city policy precluded an individual with insulin-dependent
diabetes from serving as a full duty firefighter, which prevented the plaintiff
from receiving overtime and from being considered for promotion. Id.
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diabetes. 89
III. INSULIN-DEPENDENT DIABETES AS A DISABILITY

A. Individuals with Insulin-DependentDiabetesAre a
Homogeneous PopulationThat Do Not Require
an Individualized Assessment to Ascertain DisabilityStatus
1. Individuals with Insulin-DependentDiabetes All Have Exactly
the Same Condition
Individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes all have exactly
the same disease, which only occurs when the pancreas does not
produce the hormone insulin.90 Once this happens, the only
treatment option is ongoing insulin injections if they are to stay
alive. 91 Insulin injections require careful consideration of all the
factors affecting the insulin needs of the body and close monitoring
of blood glucose levels to avoid short-term complications such as
hypoglycemia-induced seizures and coma.92
In short, insulin-dependent diabetes is an incurable disease
requiring every afflicted individual to constantly monitor their
condition in order to avoid the life-threatening short-term
complications caused by the only treatment available to keep them
alive. 93 No individual with insulin-dependent diabetes can avoid
the treatment, monitoring, or short-term complications. 94 Given
the consistency of cause, treatment, and complications, individuals
with insulin-dependent diabetes appear to be a homogeneous
population with no significant medical differences among members
of the group. It must next be determined if individuals with
insulin-dependent diabetes as a group are disabled for purposes of
the ADA.
2. Insulin-DependentDiabetes as a Disability Under The ADA as
Interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court
The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

89. See, e.g., Arena, 2000 WL 264312, at *2 (discussing threats of
dismissal). The employer threatened the plaintiff, an individual with insulindependent diabetes on medical leave from her position as Chief Accountant,
with termination if she did not return to work within two weeks. Id. The
employer also told the plaintiff that they were demoting her to an entry-level
position if she did return to work. Id.
90. GUTHRIE, supra note 53, at 16.
91. BRISCO, supra note 43, at 61.
92. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 68-72.
93. Id. at 18-24.

94. BRISCO, supra note 43, at 61.
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activities of [an] individual." 95
The definition has three
components: an impairment, a major life activity, and substantial
limitation.96 Over the past several years, the U.S. Supreme Court
97
has addressed the interpretation of each of these components.
a.

Establishing an Impairment

The ADA defines the first component, a physical or mental
impairment, as a disorder or condition affecting one or more of the
body's systems. 98 The definition is very broad and the Supreme
Court has indicated that it includes such conditions as correctable
nearsightedness. 99 Individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes
have no difficulty meeting the burden of establishing this
component of disability, 10 0 and frequently the employer does not
question that there is an impairment. 101 However, diagnosis of an
impairment is merely the first step in the analysis and by itself
10 2
does not prove a disability.
b.

Finding an Effect on a Major Life Activity

Once an impairment is established, the next step involves
identification of the major life activities that are affected by the
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
96. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632-42 (1998). Bragdon sets forth the
three-part analysis for determining substantial limitation of a major life
activity: (1) whether the condition alleged constitutes a physical or mental
impairment, (2) whether the impairment affects a major life activity, and (3)
whether the impairment of the major life activity is substantial. Id.
97. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999)
(addressing the definition of impairment); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-99 (2002) (defining major life activities and
substantial limitation).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2003). The regulation states:
(h) Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine;
or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
Id.
99. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490.
100. See, e.g., Lawson, 245 F.3d at 923-25 (finding the plaintiffs insulindependent diabetes was an impairment). The court found diabetes was an
impairment because it affected the plaintiffs eyes, joints, metabolic system,
vascular system, urinary system, and reproductive system. Id. at 923.
101. See, e.g., Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 904 n.3 (noting that the employer did not
dispute that diabetes was an impairment for purposes of the ADA).
102. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. To find a disability it was insufficient "to
merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment." Id.
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impairment. 10 3 The ADA regulations limit their discussion of
major life activity to an illustrative list and do not define the
phrase, 104 but the Supreme10 Court has determined that the word
"major" means "important." 5 The Court also held that the term
major life activity "need[s] to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," so that the
interpretation of the ADA reflects the legislative findings that
forty-three million Americans had some type of physical or mental
106
disability.
Despite the Supreme Court's admonition to use a demanding
standard, lower courts have identified nearly forty different major
life activities. 0 7 Courts have concluded that insulin-dependent
diabetes affects such major life activities as thinking, 08 caring for
oneself, 09 eating, 10 walking,"' standing," 2 working," 3 and waste

103. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
104. The regulations list major life activities "such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2003).
105. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
106. Id.
107. Brian East, Definition of Disability After Sutton: A Step-By-Step
Approach to Avoiding the Effects of Sutton v. United Air Lines, 6-10, available
at http://www.diabetes.org/uedocuments/BrianEastl213.pdf (last visited Feb.
6, 2004). The article noted:
There is authority holding that the following are major life activities:
caring for oneself, bathing, dressing, toileting, controlling bowels, waste
elimination, sleeping, getting into or out of bed, getting around outside,
getting around inside, keeping house, living independently, eating,
drinking, cooking, using stairs, sitting, standing, reaching, throwing,
squatting, bending, lifting, carrying, performing manual tasks that are
central to daily life, walking, running, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, reading, writing, thinking, learning, concentrating, cognitive
functions, reproducing or bearing children, sexual activities, working,
with others,
school, traveling, driving, interacting
attending
interpersonal relations and socializing.
Id.
The court noted that the plaintiff's
108. Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 905.
unpredictable hypoglycemic episodes substantially limited his ability to think
coherently since they caused him to make nonsensical statements, lose
consciousness, and fall. Id.
109. Id. The court linked plaintiffs ability to think coherently to his ability
to care for himself. Id.
The court held the plaintiff was
110. Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924-26.
substantially limited in the major life activity of eating, rejecting the trial
court's interpretation of substantial limitation as being the equivalent of
The court concluded the demanding regime for
complete inability. Id.
managing blood glucose levels and the severe consequences of failing to do so
created a substantial limitation on the major life activity of eating. Id. See
also EEOC and Landers, 2001 WL 1725300, at *5-6. The court found that the
plaintiff had raised questions of material fact about a substantial limit on the
major life activity of eating, noting that passing out from hypoglycemic
episodes significantly impairs the major life activities of walking, seeing,
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elimination.114
Since Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.115 and its companion
cases, commonly known as the Sutton trilogy, 116 were decided in
1999, a limitation on a major life activity must be considered in
117
light of any mitigating measures the individual has undertaken.
The effects of the mitigating measures and any adverse results of
mitigation are part of the determination of disability." 8 The
Supreme Court found that it was the actual limitations faced after
mitigation that determine disability status. 119 Courts consider
only the actual mitigation used and have rejected arguments that
20
plaintiffs could benefit from additional or different mitigation.
The ability to refrain from mitigation, which is available to many
individuals with an impairment, is not available to individuals
with insulin-dependent diabetes since they face certain death
121
within days for failure to use insulin.

hearing, breathing, and working. Id.
111. Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 8 Fed. Appx. 720, 721 (9th Cir.
2001), No. 99-17410, 2001 WL 408989 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2001). The court held
that an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes whose blood glucose level
was so adversely affected by walking that she was unable to go grocery
shopping was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Id.
112. Heimback, 2000 WL 14871, at *2. The court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss a claim where the plaintiff alleged she was substantially
limited in the life activity of standing. Id.
113. Rebhan v. Atoll Holdings, Inc., No. B140612, 2001 WL 1190434, at *34
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. Oct. 2, 2001). The court found that an individual with
insulin-dependent diabetes who experienced a number of hypoglycemic
episodes at work and lost consciousness several times was significantly
impaired in the life activity of working. Id. Losing consciousness limited the
plaintiff from working at any position where she would be unsupervised. Id.
114. Erjavac, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 746-47. The court noted that even with
insulin injections the plaintiff experienced high blood glucose levels, which
induced a need to urinate frequently and caused dehydration. Id.
115. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
116. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999).
117. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487. The Court concluded that if Congress had
wanted to cover all persons with corrected physical limitations, Congress
would have noted a significantly larger number of disabled persons in the
legislative record. Id.
118. Id. at 488.
119. Id.
120. See Finical v. Collections Unlimited Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38
(D. Ariz. 1999) (rejecting an employers argument that the plaintiff could
benefit from using a hearing aid and stating that failure to use mitigating
measures would not defeat the claim); Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 904 (stating the
mitigation standard developed in Sutton was not a license for courts to wander
into discussions of the types of mitigation a plaintiff could or should use).
Courts should only consider the actual measures taken and any adverse
affects that resulted. Id.
121. SAUDEK ETAL., supra note 12, at 19.
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Even considering use of insulin as a mitigating measure, the
courts have found that individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes are limited in major life activities. 122 For instance in
Nawrot v. CPC International,1 23 the court noted that the plaintiff
was limited in the major life activities of thinking and caring for
himself even after mitigation. 124 Despite diligent efforts involving
insulin injections and blood glucose monitoring, the plaintiff was
unable to completely control his insulin-dependent diabetes and
still suffered from hypoglycemic episodes that posed a real danger
26
of death. 125 Similarly, in Lawson v. CSX Transportation,Inc.,1
the court noted that the plaintiff was limited in his ability to eat
after using insulin, discussing his need to continually "concern
himself with the availability of food, the timing of when he eats,
and the type and quantity of food he eats."'127
The court
differentiated the constraints placed on the plaintiff from lesser
dietary restrictions potentially imposed on individuals with non128
insulin-dependent diabetes.
c. Determining if a Limitation on a Major Life Activity is
Substantial
The final requirement for establishing disability status under
the ADA is finding that major life activities are substantially
limited. 129
The ADA and EEOC regulations do not define
substantial, but the Supreme Court has looked to the language of
the statute and to standard dictionary definitions to conclude that
"substantial" means "considerable or to a large degree,"'130 but does
not mean "complete inability."'13
The court has gone on to
describe the requirement as excluding impairments that interfere
32
in minor ways or are not permanent or long lasting.
When this definition has been 'applied to individuals with
insulin-dependent diabetes the courts have found substantial
limitations on major life activities. 33 In Lawson, the appeals court

122. See, e.g., Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 905 and Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924.
123. 277 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2002).
124. Id. at 905.
125. Id.
126. Lawson, 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 924.
128. Id. at 924-25. Cf. Ingles v. Neiman Marcus Group, 974 F. Supp. 996,
1001-02 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding no limitation on the major life activity of
eating).
The court noted that a individual with non-insulin-dependent
diabetes who ate a normal diet with meals at regular intervals was not limited

in the major life activity of eating. Id.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196-97.
See, e.g., Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924.
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disagreed with the lower court finding that the plaintiff was not
substantially limited in his ability to eat because he could ingest
food. 34
The court based its finding on the extent of the
restrictions, the severity of the consequences for failing to follow
the restrictions, and testimony by the plaintiffs physician that
managing diabetes was 'a perpetual, multi-faceted and
demanding treatment regime' requiring 'continued vigilance."' 135
The court went on to distinguish the plaintiffs condition from the
myopia suffered by the plaintiffs in Sutton, noting that those
plaintiffs faced none of the coordination of treatment or constant
vigilance that an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes
faces.136
3. Homogeneous PopulationsRequire Less Individualized
Assessment for DisabilityDetermination Under the ADA
The language of the ADA and the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the statute both require an individualized
determination of disability in all cases. 37
However, this
requirement is not strictly enforced, and some disabilities are so
38
obvious that the courts never address the question of disability,
39
or the parties agree that the individual is disabled.
Instead of
debating disability status, these cases revolve around questions
that arise once there is an established disability. Such questions
include whether the individual is otherwise qualified for the
position 140 and the reasonableness of the accommodation
141
requested.
The major factor differentiating cases where disability status

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 925.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining disability with respect to an
individual). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2003) (stating that the determination of
disability must be made on a case-by-case basis). See also Sutton, 527 U.S. at
483 (holding that disability under the ADA was determined by individualized
inquiry).
138. See, e.g., Sieberns v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir. 1997)
(failing to discuss the disability status of a blind plaintiff). The court did not
analyze the existence of an impairment but, instead began the analysis with

the otherwise qualified individual inquiry. Id.
139. See, e.g., Winfrey v. City of Chicago, 259 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the defendant did not dispute that the blind plaintiff was
disabled).
140. An individual is otherwise qualified for a position if "with or without
reasonable accommodation, [they] can perform the essential functions of the

employment position that such individual holds or desires."

42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(8) (2000).
141. A reasonable accommodation imposes an obligation on the employer to
accommodate known physical or mental disabilities to the extent they do not
impose an undue burden on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)-(10) (2000).
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is litigated from those where it never arises is the uniformity of
the disabling condition. For example, individuals who are blind in
both eyes are always considered disabled, 142 as are those who are
deaf1 43 or confined to a wheelchair. 144 However, those with lesser
impairments frequently are found to be not disabled. 145
Like those with unquestioned disability status, individuals
with insulin-dependent diabetes are a uniform group for disability
assessment. 146 Unlike sufferers of conditions with widely varied
symptoms such as hypertension,1 47 carpal tunnel syndrome 48 or
bad backs,1 49 individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes all have
1 50
exactly the same condition with exactly the same symptoms.
They suffer from the complete destruction of an essential part of
the endocrine system rather than a partial loss.151 The Supreme
142. See, e.g., Sieberns, 125 F.3d at 1022 (omitting any discussion of
disability). The court did not discuss impairment of a blind plaintiff but
implied its existence by discussing the otherwise qualified portion of the ADA
test for disability. Id.
143. See, e.g., Downing v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1303,
1309 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that there was no contention by the defendant
that a deaf plaintiff was not disabled).
144. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543-44 (7th
Cir. 1995) (finding that a plaintiff paralyzed from the waist down was disabled
without discussion). The court went on to hold that the pressure sores she got
as a result of the paralysis added to the disability. Id.
145. See, e.g., Finical, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1040-43 (discussing extensively
whether a plaintiff with mild to moderate hearing loss in the low to mid
frequency range was disabled); Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50,
52 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff who was blind in one eye was not
disabled). The court found the complete loss of vision in one eye was not a
disability, even though it greatly impaired plaintiffs peripheral vision,
because his remaining eye functioned normally. Id.
146. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the medical aspects of insulindependent diabetes).
147. Compare Garvey v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15468, at *10 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 24, 2000) (finding high blood pressure an
impairment) with Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520 (finding high blood pressure was
not an impairment). In Garvey, the court held that a plaintiff who could not
be involved in any stressful social situations because it would cause his blood
pressure to rise to dangerous levels was substantially limited in the major life
activity of interpersonal relations and socializing. Garvey, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15468, at *10. However, the court in Murphy held that a mechanic
who was discharged for failing to meet Department of Transportation
guidelines for blood pressure was not disabled because he functioned normally
for everyday activities when he took his medication. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
148. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199. The varied levels of impairment created by
carpal tunnel syndrome could range from muscle atrophy and extreme loss of
feeling to merely occasionally numbness and tingling. Id.
149. See, e.g., Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating
that back problems rendered the plaintiff disabled in this case). The court
noted that this was an unusual case and back problems, which restrict lifting,
though numerous, are usually not disabilities. Id.
150. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 18-24.
151. Id. at 19. Insulin-dependent diabetes is the result of destruction of the
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Court noted in Toyota that an individualized assessment was
especially needed when the symptoms of an impairment varied
widely. 152 This statement seems to imply that less varied
symptoms do not need as extensive an assessment, and those
symptoms that do not vary at all may not need any assessment.
Additionally, all individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes
must use the same mitigation. 153 Unlike those afflicted with other
disabilities, those with insulin-dependent diabetes have no choice
about their treatment.' 54 They must use insulin injections since it
55
is the only treatment available and without it, they will die.
The mandated use of insulin means that all individuals with
insulin-dependent diabetes are subject to the same mitigationrelated adverse effects of hypoglycemic reactions. 156 Injecting
insulin causes unpredictable hypoglycemic reactions resulting in
seizures, coma, or even death. 15 7
These adverse effects of
158
mitigation are the most severe types imaginable.
Because individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes are a
homogeneous group meeting the definition of disabled under the
ADA, it would be logically inconsistent for courts to find some
members of the group disabled and others not. However, that is
exactly what courts are doing. 159 Courts across the country are
evaluating disability claims from individuals with insulin0
dependent diabetes and reaching different results. 16
insulin producing beta cells in the pancreas by the immune system. Id.
152. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199.
153. BRISCO, supra note 43, at 61.

154. Id.
155. Id. at 14.
156. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 159-60.
157. BRISCO, supra note 43, at 89.
158. Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924-26. The court noted that an individual with
insulin-dependent diabetes must deal with potentially life-threatening
complications from mitigation. Id.
They stated that the severity of the
complications distinguished the plaintiff from situations like Sutton where the
effects of noncompliance were minimal. Id.
159. See, e.g., Orr, 297 F.3d
at 724-26 (finding the plaintiff was not
disabled), cf. Lawson, 245 F.3d at 929 (finding the plaintiff was disabled).
160. In a sample of eighteen cases applying the mitigation requirement of
Sutton, individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes have established
disability so as to survive a motion for summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss in eight cases. These cases are Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 304
F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2002), Petrosky v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 72 F.
Supp. 2d 39 (N.D.N.Y 1999), Lawson, 245 F.3d 916, Lutz, 2001 WL 408989,
Landers, 2001 WL 1725300, Fraserv. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003),
Nawrot, 277 F.3d 896, and Rebhan, 2001 WL 1190434. In the ten remaining
cases, individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes did not establish a
disability and were unable to survive a motion for summary judgment or a
motion to dismiss. These cases are Orr, 297 F.3d 720, Harris v. Challenger
Motor Freight,Inc., 1999 WL 1489819 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 1999), Williamson
v. InternationalPaper Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (S.D. Ala. 2000), Denney, 2000
WL 680417, Whitney v. Sweetwater Sound, Inc., 2000 WL 33309383 (S.D. Ind.
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B. Courts Are Mistakenly Ruling That Individuals with
Insulin-DependentDiabetes Are Not Disabled
A large portion of the cases involving individuals with insulindependent diabetes are decided on motions to dismiss or summary
judgment. 6 1 Plaintiffs lost in fifty-seven percent of the reported
cases involving the question of whether diabetes is a disability
since Sutton was decided.16 2 In many of these instances, courts
rule against individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes without
fully considering all of the medical ramifications.
1. Courts Do Not Understand the Diseaseor the Mitigation.
63
is
A recent Eighth Circuit decision, Orr v. Wal-Mart,
representative of cases where courts fail to understand the medical
implications of insulin-dependent diabetes.
In rejecting the
plaintiffs disability claim, the Orr Court refused to consider the
potential impact of the plaintiffs failure to treat his insulindependent diabetes. 64 The Court focused on the plaintiffs words
in his brief, finding the fact that "he 'could experience' adverse
symptoms"' 65 for failure to adequately monitor his diabetes as
inconsistent with the requirement in Sutton that an impairment,
in fact, substantially limit a major life activity. 166 This is a narrow
reading of Sutton and implies that an individual must be
substantially limited at all times in order to gain protection from
167
the ADA, an interpretation that is not found in other case law.
Apr. 6, 2002), Mack v. Strauss, 134 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2001), Rivera v.
Apple Indus. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), Kinzer v. Fabyanske,
Westra & Hart, P.A., 2001 WL 1110371 (D. Minn. 2001), Murray, Inc., 175 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, and Grant v. May Dep't Stores, 786 A.2d 580 (D.D.C. 2001).
161. BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON DIABETES AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
FOR LAWYERS HANDLING DIABETES DISCRIMINATION CASES, American
Diabetes Association available at http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy-andlegalresources/discrimination/for_
lawyers/background material.jsp (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) [hereinafter
BACKGROUND MATERIALS].
162. Id. The statistics are based on all types of diabetes, not just insulindependent diabetes. Id.
163. 297 F.3d 720.
164. Id. at 724. The court refused to consider anything but the plaintiffs
present condition and actual consequences even though the plaintiff had
suffered several hypoglycemic reactions at work due to the defendant's refusal
to allow him an uninterrupted lunch break. Id. at 723-24.
165. Id. at 724.
166. Id.
167. The interpretation is inconsistent with case law finding disabilities
because of impairments that do not substantially limit the plaintiffs at all
time. See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (holding that HIV substantially
limited the major life activity of reproduction even though the risk of perinatal
transmission was only twenty-five percent and could be reduced to eight
percent with medication); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 670 (2001)
(noting no contention that a degenerative circulatory disorder which prevented
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In Fraserv. U.S. Bancorp,16 the District Court of Oregon held
that an individual with insulin-dependent diabetes was not
disabled despite medical evidence that her blood glucose levels
tended to change rapidly, thus causing hypoglycemic reactions at
work. 169 This court, like the court in Orr, focused on the exact
words used to describe the plaintiffs limitations, quoting from her
physician's deposition, "So if she can't take a break to eat, can't
take a break to get her shot, can't take a break to test herself, that's
a potential problem."170 The court went on to hold that there was
no actual substantial limitation, only a potential one, 171 and
72
ignored evidence of the plaintiffs prior hypoglycemic reactions
173
and hospitalization due to a diabetic coma.
2. DiabetesIs an Invisible Impairment Whose Victims Are Unable
to Convey Its Impact
Undoubtedly much of the confusion that courts encounter
when evaluating insulin-dependent diabetes comes from the
invisible nature of the disease. 174 The situation appears further
complicated by the difficulty plaintiffs seem to have in conveying
75
the extent to which the disease substantially limits them.
Plaintiffs have stated that insulin-dependent diabetes "was
just a matter of normal upkeep"' 76 and that in spite of their
condition they felt "pretty good."'1 77 These plaintiffs ignored the
established medical problems inherent in treating insulindependent diabetes. 78 The lack of specificity in pleading may be
due to several factors including the age that the plaintiff developed
insulin-dependent diabetes, 79 the "can-do" attitude adopted in
the plaintiff from walking five miles during a golf tournament was a
disability); and Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding an epileptic plaintiff was substantially limited in the life activities of
speaking, walking, and seeing when she suffered a seizure).
168. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1188.
169. Id. at 1194.
170. Id. at 1192.
171. Id. at 1194.
172. Id. at 1190.
173. Id. at 1191.
174. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 4. Half of all people in the U.S. who
have diabetes are unaware of their condition. Id.
175. See, e.g., Whitney, 2000 WL 33309383, at *6 (noting the plaintiff did not
plead any substantial limitation on the major life activity of working) and
Grant, 786 A.2d at 584-85 (noting that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any
problems with major life activities).
176. Whitney, 2000 WL 33309383, at *6.
177. Grant, 786 A.2d at 585.
178. The plaintiff in Grant did not discuss any potential problems caused by
using insulin. Id. at 584-85. The plaintiff in Whitney merely mentioned the
need to go home for medication before attending after hours business dinners.
Whitney, 2000 WL 33309383, at *6.
179. SAUDEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 19. Most individuals with insulin-
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treating insulin-dependent diabetes, 18 0 and the variance with
18
which short-term complications occur. '
The diagnosis of insulin-dependent diabetes in childhood
creates problems when trying to identify how major life activities
are substantially affected. 8 2 Individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes must speculate about how activities are affected since
they may have no memory of life before diabetes and therefore no
point of reference for comparison. 8 3 The "can-do" attitude creates
problems identifying affects on major life activities because an
individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes turns their focus from
the problems created by diabetes to minimizing its impact on daily
life.' 8 4 The variance with which short-term complications occur
leads plaintiffs to assert that problems could occur, since there is
no way to determine in advance exactly what will occur in any
85
given situation.1
The three factors combine to produce plaintiff pleadings that
do not adequately state a disability for ADA purposes. 86 The
result is that courts, reviewing these pleadings and lacking

dependent diabetes are diagnosed in childhood. Id.
180. BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 161.
181. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 160. The body does
not always use insulin consistently. Id. The inconsistent use of insulin by the
body can lead to hypoglycemic reactions on one day but not on another day
even all of the factors such as food consumption and insulin dosage are the
same. Id.
182. "I don't know what life feels like except as a diabetic." Interview with
James P. Radermacher, insulin-dependent diabetic and diabetes activist, in
Chicago, IL (Sept. 4, 2002). Mr. Radermacher was diagnosed with insulindependent diabetes in 1968 at age five. He is currently the Volunteer Illinois
Advocate Leader for the American Diabetes Association and was a named
plaintiff in a recently settled ADA Title III public accommodation claim
brought by the Department of Justice against SFX Entertainment.
183. "I can't remember what it feels like not to think about my diabetes on a
constant basis. I'm even a diabetic when I dream." Interview with James P.
Radermacher, supra note 182.
184. BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 161. A pitfall in litigation many
individuals with diabetes encounter comes from this attitude, which while
useful in treating diabetes is devastating for establishing disability status. Id.
A plaintiffs overly optimistic self-assessment need not be fatal to finding a
disability as determined by Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc., 283 F.3d
11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002). The court held that the fact the plaintiff was missing
one arm below the elbow but took a position that she was not limited did not
foreclose a finding of disability because the assessment was based more on the
plaintiffs determination that on her actual abilities. Id.
185. AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 159-60. The body's
use of insulin is inconsistent so even doing exactly the same thing on different
days will yield different results. Id. at 160.
186. See, e.g., Rivera, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (finding a plaintiff with insulindependent diabetes was not disabled). The court held the plaintiff failed to
establish a disability because he could control his diabetes with proper diet
and insulin injections. Id.
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knowledge about insulin-dependent diabetes, find that the
plaintiffs are not disabled. 187
Once the court finds the plaintiff is not disabled an absurd
situation can unfold. The plaintiff who has mitigated his condition
falls prey to a paradox; he or she ends up outside the protection of
the ADA and can be denied access to the very mitigation that was
used to deny his or her disability status. 188
IV. PROPOSAL
A. JudicialAction and Interpretation
The ADA must be broadly interpreted by the courts to fulfill
the mandate given by Congress, "[t]he purpose of the ADA is to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream
of American life." 18 9 Use of the mitigated individual standard of
Sutton' 90 has contributed to some courts failure to find individuals
with insulin-dependent diabetes to be disabled, 91 thereby allowing
their employers to deny them access to blood glucose testing,
insulin, and medically necessary food.192
Before Sutton, courts could look at a medical diagnosis for
guidance in determining impairment.193 Courts could engage in a
one-step process to determine if an individual had an
impairment. 194 Since Sutton, courts have had to look beyond the
medical diagnosis to the treatment of an impairment. 95 Not only
187. See, e.g., Williamson, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-95 (finding a plaintiff with
insulin-dependent diabetes was not disabled). The court held the plaintiff was
not disabled despite his extensive list of problems caused by insulin and
diabetes complications he experienced. Id.
188. See, e.g., Orr, 297 F.3d 720 (finding that an individual with insulindependent diabetes was not disabled because he used insulin to mitigate his
condition). Some courts have rejected the notion that an employer could
prevent an employee from using corrective measures at work and then
claiming the actions were beyond the reach of the ADA because the employee
was not disabled. Denney, 2000 WL 680417, at *10.
189. H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, at 23 (1990).
190. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
191. Orr, 297 F.3d 720.
192. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing cases
involving employers who denied individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes
opportunities to control their diabetes during work hours).
193. See, e.g., Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336, 340 (W.D.
Okla. 1994) (noting that the plaintiff was disabled based on a medical
diagnosis of insulin-dependent diabetes).
194. Id. The court looked at the medical diagnosis and determined that the
plaintiff was impaired because he would suffer debilitating symptoms and
eventually death without insulin. Id.
195. See, e.g., Grant, 786 A.2d at 586 (holding that a plaintiff was not
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must courts determine what the impairment is, but they must also
196
determine if there is an impairment after the plaintiff is treated.
Courts must delve into the realm of medicine and decide what
197
effect, good or bad, the treatment has had on the impairment.
Courts frequently ignore the adverse effects of treatment, looking
198
only at the positive ones.
Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 199 clearly demonstrates an
example of the paradox created by Sutton. The plaintiff, an
individual with insulin-dependent diabetes, had an impairment
without mitigation, 200 but was judged after mitigation. 201 The
court found that he no longer had an impairment, 202 and that he
could not look to the ADA for protection from employer
discrimination. 203 The employer was then free to deny a request
for accommodation. 204 This denial prevented the plaintiff from
using the mitigation that forced him outside the protection of the
ADA in the first place.205 The employer had in effect rendered the
plaintiff disabled at work but unable to invoke protection from the
ADA.206

The courts can close this loophole for employers in several
ways. First, the courts could find that insulin-dependent diabetes
is a per se disability. 20 7 Unfortunately, this is at odds with the
Supreme Court's persistent determination that impairment and
disabled because insulin mitigated her condition).
196. Id. The plaintiff, through "diligent monitoring, diet, and insulin use,"
was able to control her blood sugar levels. Id. at 581. Due to her mitigation,
she felt "pretty good" and the court found she was not substantially limited in
any major life activities. Id. at 585.
197. See, e.g., Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 904-05 (discussing the problems created
by insulin injections). The court found the plaintiff was so adversely affected
by insulin injections that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA as
interpreted in Sutton. Id.
198. See, e.g., Fraser, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (holding that the adverse
affects of insulin did not substantially limit the plaintiff). The court reiterated
the plaintiffs problems caused by insulin including a hypoglycemic episode at
work that caused her to lapse into a coma. Id. Notwithstanding the events it
discussed, the court held she was not substantially limited in any major life
activity. Id.
199. Orr, 297 F.3d 720.
200. Id. at 724.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 722-23. The plaintiff had requested an uninterrupted lunch
break so he could eat immediately after injecting insulin. Id.
205. Orr, 297 F.3d at 724.
206. Id.
207. This action finds support in the legislative history of the ADA, which
states "persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the
definition of disability [actual disability], even if the effects of the impairment
are controlled by medication." H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52.
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disability must be established on an individualized basis. 208
The courts could also solve this problem by interpreting the
ADA as preventing employers from disallowing the use of
mitigation. This solution falls outside of the scope of the ADA,
which provides no mechanism requiring employer action in the
absence of a finding of disability.20 9 Furthermore, if adopted, this
solution could add another layer to the already complicated
question of disability determination. Courts could find themselves
locked in a circular analysis, with plaintiffs considered at first as
having an impairment, and then later as not having one based on
their own actions, those of their employer, or subsequent changes
by either.
B. Legislative Solutions
Neither judicial solution is workable. A per se disability
pronouncement defies the plain language of the statute and all
judicial interpretation to date. 210 Preventing employers from
interfering with mitigation falls outside the scope of the ADA and
creates never-ending questions of impairment. 211 Since judicial
solutions do not seem viable, legislative solutions are more
appropriate.
1.

Medical CriteriaTest

The first possibility for a legislative solution is amending the
ADA to provide that certain medical conditions are per se
disabilities. Mark Rothstein, Serge Martinez and Paul McKinney,
professors at University of Louisville School of Medicine,
suggested this approach in a recent article. 212 In the article, they
suggest amending the ADA to authorize the EEOC to "publish
medical standards for determining disability for the most common
physical and mental impairments." 21 3
The article proposes
medical standards for twelve different physical impairments

208. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 691-92. This case, decided in 2002, held that
Congress "intended the existence of a disability to be determined in such a
case-by-case manner." Id. at 692.
209. Title I of the ADA mandates that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
210. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 691-92.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). The language of the ADA provides for action
only when an employer discriminates against a disabled individual. Id.
212. Mark A. Rothstein, et al., Using Established Medical Criteriato Define
Disability:A Proposal to Amend the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 243, 269-82 (2002).
213. Id. at 270.
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including diabetes. 214
Such a solution has appeal. It would provide clarity to both
employers and employees about who the law would consider
disabled. 215 Such clarity could result'in less litigation and would
fit within the current disability framework for ease of
216
implementation.
However, there are several problems with this solution.
Congress seems very reluctant to amend the ADA, and since the
Act's inception has passed only four minor amendments. 217 None
of these amendments affected the basic manner in which the ADA
operates. 218 Additionally, basing disability on established medical
criteria could open the process up to constant amendment as
future medical advances allow more people with impairments to
obtain mitigating treatments that allow them to enter the
workforce. Finally, the establishment of the criteria could be
subject to significant pressures from special interest groups,
leading to criteria that were less reflective of actual medical
diagnosis and more reflective of special interest group clout.
2. Access to Self-Administered Medical Treatment
This Comment proposes an additional solution: new
legislation that would forbid employers, schools, places of public
accommodation, and other entities from interfering with the selfadministration of medically prescribed treatment.
The new
legislation would close the loophole in the ADA and would
facilitate the access to "the economic and social mainstream of
214. The article proposes disability standards for arthritis, asthma, bipolar I
mood disorder, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart
failure, diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, hearing impairments, malignancy,
multiple sclerosis, renal failure, and vision impairments. Id. at 282-96. The
proposed standard for diabetes would include as disabled all individuals who
are insulin-dependent as well as those who were non-insulin-dependent but
had experienced diabetes related eye, nerve, or kidney problems. Id. at 289.
215. Id. at 270.
216. Id.
217. Over 800 bills referencing the ADA have been introduced in Congress
since the ADA was enacted. http://thomas.loc.gov (http://thomas.loc.gov, the
official site for legislative materials maintained by the Library of Congress,
was searched for any reference to the ADA in legislation introduced between
the enactment of the ADA and November 2002.) Only four bills have been
enacted which amend the ADA: Pub. L. No. 102-166, Pub. L. No. 104-1, Pub.
L. No. 104-59, and Pub. L. No. 104-287.
218. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109 amended the ADA to extend its protection to
U.S. citizens working in foreign countries. Pub. L. No. 104-1, §§ 201(c)(3) and
210(g) extended the protections of the ADA to employees of the legislative
branch of the federal government. Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 341 modified the
effective dates for accessibility on over-the-road buses. Pub. L. No. 104-287,
§ 6(k) changed terminology from "commuter service" to "commuter rail
passenger transportation." No changes were made to the way the ADA was
originally designed to function.
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American life" 219 mandated by Congress when the ADA was
enacted.
The proposed legislation would benefit individuals who do not
meet the strict requirements of disability under the ADA but still
find themselves subject to discrimination in treating their medical
condition. 220 Such legislation could be of particular benefit to
those who do not seek an accommodation in the traditional sense
of barrier removal or adaptive technology, 221 but only seek to be
able to treat or mitigate their impairment as medically needed and
222
prescribed.
Narrowly crafted legislation would address the specific
problem encountered by individuals with insulin-dependent
diabetes when treating themselves. It would also apply to other
medical treatments available now or in the future. It could avoid
problems arising from amending the ADA, such as either
drastically expanding the scope of the ADA to include non-disabled
persons or limiting protection to those who fall within the ADA in
their unmitigated state.
The proposed legislation allows for changes in medical
treatment and technology without the constant need for new rules
and legislation. Like the ADA, the scope of the legislation could
constantly adjust to the changing scope of self-administered
medical treatments available, and it would cover individuals
whose new treatment pushed them outside the protection of the
ADA.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ADA cannot always provide the protection Congress
intended when the mitigation standard for disability is applied.
Applying the Sutton standard allows employers to deny employees
the reasonable accommodation of using mitigating treatment by
219. H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22.
220. See, e.g., Orr, 297 F.3d at 723-25 and Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924-26
(arriving at different conclusions as to whether plaintiffs' diabetes
substantially impaired a major life activity).
221. The ADA states that:
"reasonable accommodation" may include- (A) making existing facilities
used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
222. Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 901-02. The plaintiff requested an accommodation
of leaving the factory floor to test his blood sugars and treat his diabetes as
needed on several occasions. Id. The employer refused the request every
time. Id.
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arguing that their medical conditions are not substantially
disabling when mitigated. 223 This paradox punishes those who
treat their impairment and is particularly damaging to individuals
who have no choice in the mitigation they use. Congress and the
courts should act to ensure that no one can deny an individual
access to prescribed, self-administered medical treatment. By
doing so, they will help close the loophole created by Sutton and
will extend protection to individuals who seek to treat their
medical conditions without interference.

223. Orr, 297 F.3d at 724.

